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I Comments I
Maintenance Payments and Same-Sex
Relationships: When an Ex-Spouse




Same-sex committed sexual relationships, known as partnerships or
unions, have received considerable attention throughout American
culture in recent years.' It is presently more commonplace, or at least
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2005.
1. One important area that homosexual relationships have gained attention is in the
American legal context. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass. 2003) (holding that the limitation of protections, benefits, and obligations of civil
marriage to individuals of opposite sexes lacked rational basis and violated state
constitutional equal protection principles); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999)
(holding that the exclusion of same sex couples from the benefits and protections incident
to marriage under Vermont law violated the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont
Constitution); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (holding that a statute restricting
the marital relationship to two individuals of opposite sexes is subject to the strict
scrutiny test of equal protection under the Hawaii Constitution).
It is presently more common for homosexual celebrities to make their gay status and
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quite less shocking than in the past, to see same-sex relationships and
homosexual activity depicted on television and in the media. 2  Such
depictions were scarce and highly controversial as recently as ten years
ago.3
While one might see evidence of homosexuality and same-sex
relationships gaining acceptance in American culture through the media,
the vast majority of states restrict marriage and the benefits of marriage
to opposite sex couples. 4 Some states have enacted statutes prohibiting
the recognition of same-sex marriages 5 and others specifically exclude
same-sex couples from receiving benefits that married heterosexual
romantic relationships known to the public. Ellen Degeneres and Rosie O'Donnell are
two well known examples. For information concerning Ellen Degeneres and her
lifestyle, see Ellen Degeneres Tribute Page available at
http://www.angelfire.com/tv/ellendegeneres/ (last visited January 25, 2004). For
information concerning Rosie O'Donnell and her lifestyle, see Everything Rosie: Rosie
Biography available at http://www.acmewebpages.com/rosie/ (last visited January 25,
2004).
Additionally, it is not uncommon for a television show to feature fictional sitcom
characters who are gay. Showtime's Queer as Folk is a series that explores the daily
realities of gay lifestyles. See Queer as Folk available at http://www.sho.com/site/
queer/home.do (last visited January 25, 2004).
2. There are presently several television shows in which homosexual characters are
prominent. See Will & Grace (NBC television sitcom) (Title character Will Truman,
played by actor Eric McCormack, and character Jack McFarland, played by actor Sean
Hayes, are lead characters who are both gay); The Real World (MTV series)
(Homosexual individuals have appeared in numerous seasons of The Real World. Two
early examples are Norman from Season 1, broadcast in 1992, and Pedro from Season 3,
broadcast in 1993).
3. See, e.g., Roseanne: Don't Ask, Don't Tell (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 1,
1994). This episode contained a scene in which lead character Roseanne visited a gay bar
and received a kiss on the lips from actress Mariel Hemingway, who was a guest lesbian
character in the episode. See Roseanne Kiss, available at http://www.thefileroom.org/
documents/dyn/DisplayCase.cfn/id/236 (last visited Jan. 11, 2004). For a discussion of
the controversy surrounding this episode, see id.
4. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101 (2002) ("The marriage contract is to be
considered in law as a civil contract between two parties who are of opposite sex. All
other marriages are declared to be contrary to the public policy of this state and are
void."); MINN. STAT. § 517.01 (1997) ("Lawful marriage may be contracted only between
persons of the opposite sex .. "); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 3 (1979) ("Any unmarried
person of the age of eighteen (18) years or upwards and not otherwise disqualified is
capable of contracting and consenting to marriage with a person of the opposite
sex .. "). But cf Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941 (holding that the limitation of protections,
benefits, and obligations of civil marriage to individuals of opposite sexes violated state
constitutional principles); Baker, 744 A.2d 864 (holding that the exclusion of same sex
couples from the benefits and protections incident to marriage violated the Vermont
Constitution); Baehr, 852 P.2d 44 (holding that a statute restricting the marital
relationship to two individuals of opposite sexes may not be constitutional under the
Hawaii Constitution).
5. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 517.01 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101 (2002);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 3 (1979)
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couples are able to secure under state law.6 Family law courts and state
legislators have felt considerable pressure to remedy the disparate
treatment same-sex couples receive through judicial decisions and
legislation. In some states, there have been significant changes as
homosexual citizens, same-sex couples, and their supporters have sought
social and legal acceptance and recognition of same-sex partnerships.7
For some heterosexual individuals, it may not only seem tempting,
but also entirely possible, to consider their lives separate and unaffected
by homosexuality. 8 Many may consider the issues surrounding the legal
recognition of same-sex partnerships as an area of little personal
importance. 9 It has become increasingly difficult, however, to isolate
traditional heterosexual relationships from homosexual relationships in
some legal contexts.' 0 In many states, for instance, same-sex couples
may adopt children.' 1 Lesbian couples may choose to raise a child that
In a related context:
Acting in response to the argument that states might be required to recognize
same sex marriages celebrated in other states under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the United States Constitution, Congress passed legislation called the
"Defense of Marriage Act," H.R. 3396, 104th Cong. (1996). One portion of the
Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (West 1996), provides as follows: "No
State ... shall be required to give effect to any ... record ... of any other State
respecting a relationghip between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other State....
HOMER H. CLARK, JR. & ANN LAQUER EST1N, DOMESTIC RELATIONS: CASES AND
PROBLEMS 166 (3d ed. 2000).
6. See, e.g., Devlin v. Philadelphia, 809 A.2d 980 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002), appeal
docketed, 833 A.2d 1115 (Pa. 2003) (holding that the municipality of Philadelphia was
not entitled to exempt real estate transfers between same-sex life partners from real estate
transfer tax); In re Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding that
surviving partner of homosexual relationship was not entitled to right of election against
decedent's will). But cf Langan v. Saint Vincent's Hosp. of N.Y., 765 N.Y.S.2d 411
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (holding that surviving same-sex partner, under Vermont Law, was
entitled to bring wrongful death action in New York for death of same-sex partner).
7. See, e.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941; Baker, 744 A.2d 864; Baehr, 852 P.2d 44.
8. Despite increased appearances of homosexual characters on television, Will &
Grace, The Real World, supra note 2, many heterosexual Americans may not have had
personal contact with homosexual individuals. The concept of homosexuality and the
reality of individuals in same-sex partnerships may seem very distant to those in rural,
conservative communities.
9. It is conceivable for a heterosexual individual to feel entirely unaffected by
homosexuality. A heterosexual individual may never know a homosexual individual
personally and may have little idea of lifestyles that differ from his or her own
heterosexual lifestyle.
10. See generally Garcia v. Garcia, 60 P.3d 1174 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (terminating
alimony payments to ex-spouse who began living with same-sex partner); Kripp v. Kripp,
784 A.2d 158 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001), appeal docketed, 807 A.2d 830 (Pa. 2002) (denying
alimony modification when ex-spouse began to reside with same-sex partner); Van Dyck
v. Van Dyck, 425 S.E.2d 853 (Ga. 1993) (holding that modification of alimony is not
allowed although former spouse is living with a partner of the same sex).
11. See, e.g., In re K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that an
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has been conceived through artificial insemination and is therefore the
biological child of one of the partners. 2 In addition, it is not always
astonishing for an individual to leave a heterosexual relationship and to
later pursue a committed relationship with a member of the same sex.'3
The family courts of some states have been forced to decide cases
where an ex-spouse petitioned to terminate alimony payments because a
former spouse had entered a committed same-sex relationship. 14 Courts
that have encountered this problem have treated the issue differently.,
5
Specifically, cases with very similar facts have reached apparently
opposite outcomes in different states.
1 6
This comment discusses the different ways that state courts have
treated an ex-spouse's challenge to modify or discontinue alimony
payments when an ex-spouse has entered a committed same-sex
relationship. State courts have encountered difficulties in justifying
alimony modifications because many state statutes do not recognize
same-sex committed sexual relationships in the same way as committed
heterosexual relationships. When same-sex partnerships are not
recognized in this way under state law, state courts often find themselves
unable to remedy an inequitable situation. A petition to modify or
terminate alimony may be denied although a former spouse may
essentially be "married" to a member of the same sex. This presents a
problem that must be remedied through legislative action.
This comment examines how family courts have treated
maintenance awards that are challenged by an ex-spouse when the
former spouse has later entered into a committed same-sex relationship.
unmarried, same-sex couple in a committed sexual relationship may adopt a child); In re
Adoptions of B.L.V.B. and E.L.B.B, 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993) (allowing adoption of
children by natural mother's same-sex partner if it is in the best interests of the children).
12. See, e.g., Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003) (holding that a
former domestic partner could adopt the biological child conceived through artificial
insemination of the other partner during the partnership even though the other partner did
not relinquish her parental rights); In re Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993) (holding that petitioner, a lesbian, could adopt the child of
her partner that was conceived through artificial insemination during the partnership
because adoption was in the best interests of the child).
13. See, e.g., Garcia, 60 P.3d 1174 (ex-spouse entered a relationship with a same-
sex partner following divorce); Kripp, 784 A.2d 158 (ex-wife entered a sexual
relationship with another woman upon divorce); Van Dyck, 425 S.E.2d 853 (ex-spouse
began living with a partner of the same sex after divorce).
14. See, e.g., Garcia, 60 P.3d 1174 (terminating alimony payments to ex-spouse who
began living with same-sex partner); Kripp, 784 A.2d 158 (denying alimony modification
when ex-spouse began to reside with same-sex partner); Van Dyck, 425 S.E.2d 853
(holding that modification of alimony is not allowed although former spouse is living
with a partner of the same sex).
15. See cases cited supra note 14.
16. See cases cited supra note 14.
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Part II discusses the purpose of maintenance awards upon marriage
dissolution and factors that courts consider in awarding and modifying
maintenance awards. Part III focuses on recent state cases that consider
an ex-spouse payor's petition to modify maintenance payments when the
recipient has entered a same-sex relationship which is akin to marriage.
Part IV suggests workable solutions for the legal community to prevent
inequitable judicial results should an alimony recipient enter a same-sex
partnership. Part IV provides suggestions for state courts and
legislatures regarding same-sex relationships in the context of alimony
termination.
II. Background
Alimony, also called maintenance and spousal support, is "a court
ordered allowance that one spouse pays to the other spouse for
maintenance and support."' 17 Alimony awards are authorized by statute
in all states. 18  A state court may order alimony to be paid while a
married couple is separated, while a couple is involved in a matrimonial
lawsuit, or after the couple has been divorced.' 9 The over-arching
purpose of an award of alimony, in any context, is to "assist a spouse
who has been financially dependent during the marriage in making a
transition to economic self-sufficiency. ' '20  Importantly, "the two
objectives of maintenance awards are support and fairness.'
17. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 58 (7th ed. 1999); see also 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce
and Separation § 750. ("Permanent alimony is an award for support and
maintenance .... ).
In this comment, I use the terms "alimony," "maintenance," and "spousal support"
interchangeably.
18. Clark, supra note 5, at 792; see also 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation
§ 630 ("The power or jurisdiction to award alimony is purely statutory. Thus, the
authority to award alimony must ordinarily be conferred by statute or it does not
exist.... If the court lacks jurisdiction to award alimony, it cannot be conferred by the
consent of the parties.").
19. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 58 (7th ed. 1999). For a discussion of when in a
marriage relationship alimony may be awarded (including separation, while a divorce
action is pending, and after a final divorce decree has been entered), see id.
20. Clark, supra note 5, at 792.
21. 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 750. The entire quote reads:
The two objectives of maintenance are support and fairness, where the support
objective serves to support the recipient spouse in accordance with the needs
and earning capacities of the parties, and the fairness objective is meant to
ensure fair and equitable financial arrangements between the parties in each
individual case to compensate the recipient spouse for contributions made to
the marriage, to give effect to the parties' financial arrangements, or to prevent
the unjust enrichment of either party.
Id. See also In re Marriage of LaRocque, 406 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Wis. 1987) (discussing
the two objectives of alimony: "to support the recipient spouse in accordance with the
needs and earning capacities of the parties (the support objective) and to ensure a fair and
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A. Permanent Alimony
22
This comment will focus on what is traditionally considered the
most long-term type of alimony, called periodic or permanent alimony,
which is awarded in a judgment granting a final separation or divorce.
23
An award of permanent alimony has historical roots stemming from the
concept that a husband has a common-law duty to support his wife.
2 4
Permanent alimony is awarded in payments, usually weekly or monthly,
that are indefinite in nature.25
"The generally accepted purpose of permanent alimony is to enable
a spouse who is disadvantaged through marriage to enjoy a standard of
,,26
living commensurate with the standard of living during the marriage.
In fixing the amount of permanent alimony payments, a court considers
the incomes and needs of both parties so as to avoid impoverishing either
27party. The court's primary goal is to "preserve the status quo that the
parties enjoyed during the marriage" by ensuring the continued
equitable financial arrangement between the parties in each individual case (the fairness
objective)").
22. According to the entry for "alimony" in Black's Law Dictionary, there are four
distinct types of alimony, each of which serves a different purpose. The three types of
alimony, in addition to permanent alimony, are temporary alimony, rehabilitative
alimony and reimbursement alimony. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 58 (7th ed. 1999);
see also Clark, supra note 5, at 803, 805.
The Black's entry for alimony also includes, as a subcategory, "alimony in gross,"
or "lump-sum alimony," which is defined as, "alimony in the form of a single and
definite sum not subject to modification." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 58 (7th ed. 1999).
American Jurisprudence identifies three types of alimony: temporary alimony,
permanent alimony, and rehabilitative alimony. See 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and
Separation § 609.
Tax considerations may persuade a court to award a definite sum to be distributed
pursuant to a schedule. See Clark, supra note 5, at 834, for an explanation of the
treatment of alimony under federal income taxation laws. ("Under the Internal Revenue
Code, alimony payments are deductible from the income of the payer and included in the
taxable income of the receiving spouse. 26 U.S.C. §§ 71(a), 215. This is not true of
payments made to effectuate a property division between husband and wife .. "). Id.
It is important to distinguish an award of alimony from a division of property
incident to a divorce. See id. at 791. See also 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation
§§ 490, 558.
23. See 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 750.
24. See id.
25. See id. This is why permanent alimony is also called "periodic alimony."
Permanent alimony is periodic in nature because the recipient spouse receives a sum over
a period of time, usually at the same time every month. Id.
26. Id. The purpose of permanent alimony awards has been expressed in states'
common law. See, e.g., Bains v. Bains, 764 N.Y.S.2d 721, 724 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)
("The overriding purpose of a maintenance award is to give the spouse economic
independence. Spousal support should be awarded for a duration that would provide the
recipient with enough time to become self-supporting.").
27. 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 750.
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maintenance of the financially disadvantaged party.28 The court will
order permanent alimony when the parties' "relative economic
circumstances make it appropriate."
'29
Because jurisdiction to award alimony resides with state courts and
is created by statute, each state may apply a different set of factors to
consider in awarding permanent alimony.3 ° In keeping with the purpose
and function of alimony awards, however, the factors that states consider
are similar.3 . State courts typically consider a couple's standard of living
during the marriage, the earning capacity of both parties, and the
supporting spouse's ability to continue to support the other Spouse.
32
Further, permanent alimony may be awarded "in situations in which a
spouse's prospects for financial independence are limited.,
33
State statutes normally provide a set of relevant factors for courts to
consider in determining the amount of alimony to be awarded.34
Relevant factors typically include the earning capacities of the parties,
the mental health of the parties, the sources of income to each party, one
party's contributions to the earning capacity of the other party (if
applicable), the standard of living that the parties established during the
marriage, both parties' capabilities to be self-supporting, the relative
education of the parties, and the length of the marriage. 35 Some statutes
also include a "catch-all" provision that allows a court to consider any
factors it deems relevant.36
B. Modification and Termination of Permanent Alimony
Anytime after a court's initial award of permanent alimony, a party
may seek to modify or terminate alimony payments.37 A court with
38proper jurisdiction can modify a party's alimony obligation.
"Permanent alimony is permanent only in the sense that it is a final
provision for maintenance that is contained in a judgment either
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Clark, supra note 5, at 792.
31. Compare 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3701(b) (1997) with Wis. STAT. § 767.26, (1985-
86). Pennsylvania's and Wisconsin's lists of relevant factors for courts to consider in
awarding alimony are nearly identical.
32. See, e.g., Miles v. Miles, 586 S.E.2d 136 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003); Ederer v. Ederer,
No. 96-502485.03, 2003 WL 22221307 (Ala. Civ. App. Sept. 26, 2003).
33. Clark, supra note 5, at 792-93.
34. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3701(b) (1997); Wis. STAT. § 767.26, (1985-86).
35. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3701(b) (1997); WIS. STAT. § 767,26, (1985-86). List
compiled from Wisconsin and Pennsylvania statues.
36. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 767.26, (1985-86).
37. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3701(e) ("An order entered pursuant to this
section.. .may be modified, suspended, terminated or reinstituted or a new order made.").
38. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3701.
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decreeing separate maintenance or granting divorce., 39  As a general
rule, alimony payments usually terminate on the remarriage of the
recipient or the death of either party.4 ° It is not uncommon, however, for
an alimony obligation to be modified or cancelled prior to the occurrence
of either of these events.41
Alimony is subject to modification upon a showing of changed
circumstances of either party.42 Modification of an order to pay alimony
is permitted pursuant to state statute and through the common law.43 The
party seeking modification has the burden of proving that economic
circumstances have changed and that the change will be enduring and
significant enough to warrant a modification of alimony.44 Changed
circumstances may include an increase or decrease in the income or
financial needs of either the recipient or the payor spouse.45  For
example, a decrease in the financial needs of the recipient spouse may
occur when the recipient spouse moves in with a relative and begins to
share living expenses. 46  It is important to recognize, however, that
whether to modify an order for alimony is under the discretion of the
court. In most states, "a trial court is not.., required to modify alimony
because of a change in the circumstances of the parties.
4 7
Some states authorize termination of alimony not only upon
remarriage of a recipient spouse, 48 but also when the recipient spouse
39. 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 750.
40. Clark, supra note 5, at 791.
41. See 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation § 470.
42. See, e.g., Ederer v. Ederer, No. 96-502485.03, 2003 WL 22221307, *2 (Ala. Civ.
App. Sept. 26, 2003) ("An obligation to pay alimony may be modified only upon a
showing of a material change in circumstances that has occurred since the trial court's
previous judgment .. "); Miles v. Miles, 586 S.E.2d 136, 139 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003)
("Changed conditions may warrant a modification or termination of alimony.").
43. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3701(e) ("Modification and Termination. An
order entered pursuant to this section is subject to further order of the court upon changed
circumstances of either party of a substantial and continuing nature whereupon the order
may be modified .... ). See also Ederer, 2003 WL 22221307 at *2; Miles, 586 S.E.2d at
139.
44. See Ederer, 2003 WL 22221307 at *2.
45. See generally id. (remanding the case for modification of alimony when the
payor's income had increased and the recipient showed that she was struggling
financially); Miles, 586 S.E.2d at 139 (stating that a recipient spouse's entry into a
relationship tantamount to marriage and economic reliance on her new partner is a
sufficient change in circumstances supporting alimony modification).
46. See Miles, 586 S.E.2d at 139 ("Living with another, whether it is with a 'live-in-
lover, a relative, or a platonic housemate,' changes the supported ex-spouse's
circumstances and alters the need for financial support.") (quoting Vance v. Vance, 340
S.E.2d 554, 555 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986)).
47. Ederer, No. 96-502485.03, 2003 WL 22221307, at *2 (Ala. Civ. App. Sept. 26,
2003).
48. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3706 (1999).
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cohabitates with another person.49 Cohabitation may be considered a
"bar to alimony" in a state statute or may be presented as a "changed
circumstance" that would bar further alimony payments. 50  Generally,
most state courts will terminate alimony payments when a recipient
spouse remarries or enters a relationship akin to marriage. 1 Marriage
and relationships akin to marriage relationships are often characterized
by economic reliance, shared living expenses, and a sharing of the same
residence.52 An ongoing relationship of this sort is usually seen as a
changed circumstance or as a bar to alimony under statute. 3
III. Analysis
A. An Unworkable Statute and Inequitable Judicial Decision:
Pennsylvania's Kripp v. Kripp
54
1. Facts, Holding, and Statutory Authority
In 2001, Pennsylvania became one of several states to examine a
case in which an ex-husband sought to terminate alimony payments
because his former wife began sharing a household with her same-sex
partner. 5 In Kripp v. Kripp, a case of first impression in Pennsylvania,
the superior court held that the ex-husband must continue to pay alimony
pursuant to the Property Settlement Agreement that the parties had
entered into at the time of their divorce. 6 The court concluded that the
legal definition of the term "cohabitate" did not include a member of the
same sex and, therefore, the ex-husband had failed to establish that
49. Black's Law Dictionary defines cohabitation as, "The fact or state of living
together, especially as partners in life, usually with the suggestion of sexual relations."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 207 (7th ed. 1999). Subentries under cohabitation include
"illicit cohabitation," "matrimonial cohabitation," and "notorious cohabitation." Id.
50. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3706 (1999) ("Bar to Alimony. No petitioner is
entitled to receive an award of alimony where the petitioner, subsequent to the divorce
pursuant to which alimony is being sought, has entered into cohabitation with a person of
the opposite sex who is not a member of the family of the petitioner .. ") See also
Miles, 586 S.E.2d at 139 ("In cases where our courts have found a change in
circumstances based on a relationship tantamount to marriage, the supported ex-spouse
has been involved in a relationship with another in which the parties have economically
relied upon one another.").
51. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3706; Miles, 586 S.E.2d at 139.
52. See sources cited supra note 51.
53. See sources cited supra note 51.
54. Kripp v. Kripp, 784 A.2d 158 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 165. On appeal, the superior court reversed the trial court's earlier
decision (cite earlier decision). Id.
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maintenance payments should be terminated.57
In Kripp, the court examined the contractual language of the parties'
Property Settlement Agreement that had been entered into at the time of
their divorce. 58 The Agreement stated, "alimony payments [will] end
should wife co-habitate [sic], except that a minimum alimony period of
24 months [must] be paid." 59 The ex-husband paid alimony for two
years, but then notified his ex-wife that the payments would stop because
she was cohabitating with a same-sex partner, thereby violating the
parties' Agreement.
60
On appeal, the superior court found that the trial court erred by
considering parol evidence, 61 including the ex-husband's statements
regarding conversations between the parties and testimony as to what the
parties meant when they used the term "cohabitation" in their
Agreement. 62  The ex-husband claimed that he and his ex-wife had
agreed that cohabitation included "living with anyone, including a family
member or member of the same sex.",6 3 The appellate court asserted that
the term "cohabitation" in the parties' agreement was not ambiguous,
although it was not defined in the Agreement itself.
64
The court examined prior legislative and common law treatment of
the term "cohabitation" in Pennsylvania and found that cohabitation, by
definition, does not include same-sex couples. 65 The appellate court
refused to "expand the definition of 'cohabitation' to include living with
anyone, including a family member or member of the same sex. '66 The
court cited precedent in which cohabitation was defined as:
[when] two persons of the opposite sex reside together in the manner
of husband and wife, mutually assuming those rights and duties
usually attendant upon the marriage relationship. Cohabitation may
be shown by evidence of financial, social and sexual
interdependence, by a sharing of the same residence, and by other
57. Id. at 164.
58. Id. at 163-64. The Property Settlement Agreement stated that the ex-husband
was to pay $1000 per month for five years to his ex-wife as alimony and support. Id. at
164.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 160-61.
61. Id. at 163. "The parol evidence rule 'forbids the introduction of parol evidence
of antecedent or contemporaneous agreements, negotiations and understandings of the
contracting parties for the purposes of varying or contradicting the terms of a contract
which both parties intended to represent the definite and complete statement of their
agreement." Id. (quoting Davis v. Davis, 619 A.2d 743, 746 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 162.
64. Id. at 163.
65. Id. at 163-64.
66. Id. at 162.
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67means....
The court asserted that this was the unambiguous meaning of
cohabitation that the parties had intended, which does not include same-
sex couples.68 Additionally, the court discussed legislative intent in
declining to expand the term "cohabitation" to include same-sex
couples. 69 The court concluded that:
[B]ecause we hold that the term "cohabitation" heretofore
specifically has been defined in our statutes and case law as requiring
members of the opposite sex who are not family members within the
degrees of consanguinity to reside together "in the manner of
husband and wife," we find that its reference by the parties in their
Property Settlement Agreement was not ambiguous.
70
After excluding the husband's testimony regarding what the contracting
parties had intended through their use of the term "cohabitation," the
court looked only within the Pennsylvania judicial system to conclude
that the term "cohabitation" does not include members of the same sex.
71
The court found Pennsylvania's common law, statutory language, and
legislative intent as clearly excluding same-sex couples from those who
may be considered to "cohabitate. ' '72 It declined to expand the definition
of "cohabitation" because, the court reasoned, this was the job of the
Pennsylvania Legislature, not the state courts.7 3
In Kripp, the Pennsylvania Superior Court cited the Pennsylvania
Divorce Code as statutory authority for the assertion that the
Pennsylvania Legislature has not included same-sex couples in its
definition of those who cohabitate.74 The court relied on title 23, section
67. Id. at 163 (quoting Miller v. Miller, 508 A.2d 550, 554 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)).
68. Id. at 164.
69. Id. at 163.
70. Id. at 164.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 163. The court stated:
Limitations on the courts' power to promulgate policy decisions is consistent
with the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers, a doctrine which
has been at the heart of our governmental system since the 1776 Plan or Form
of Government for the Commonwealth of the State of Pennsylvania. "By this
doctrine, the legislative branch, and not the judicial branch, is given the power
to promulgate legislation. To aggregate to ourselves the power to write
legislation would upset the delicate balance in our tripartite system of
government."
Id. (quoting in part In re Adoption of C.C.G., 762 A.2d 724, 728 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)
(en banc)).
74. Id. at 163. The court stated:
This Court has consistently held, pursuant to the Divorce Code, that "in order
to be found in 'cohabitation' one must at least be doing so 'with a person of the
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3706, of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, entitled "Bar to
Alimony," to reach this conclusion. 75 The applicable provision reads:
No petitioner is entitled to receive an award of alimony where the
petitioner, subsequent to the divorce pursuant to which alimony is
being sought, has entered into cohabitation with a person of the
opposite sex who is not a member of the family of the petitioner
within the degrees of consanguinity.
76
As indicated, section 3706 contains a specific reference to members of
the "opposite sex" in explanation of the term "cohabitation" that would
terminate alimony payments. 7 In Kripp, the superior court implied that
Pennsylvania state courts should not include same-sex partners in the
meaning of the term "cohabitation" until the Pennsylvania legislature
revised the statute. 78 The Pennsylvania courts will not include same-sex
couples in the definition of cohabitation until the Pennsylvania
legislature revised the code explicitly to include couples of the same
sex.
79
2. Implications of the Decision
The decision in Kripp is fundamentally unfair because the superior
court would have found that the wife had been "cohabitating" if her
partner had been male. In order to satisfy the definition of cohabitation,
the court required "two persons of the opposite sex [to be] mutually
assuming those rights and duties usually attendant upon the marriage
relationship." 80 The court also required "evidence of financial, social
and sexual interdependence [through] a sharing of the same residence,
and by other means., 81 The requirement that the two individuals be of
the opposite sex appears only in title 23, section 3706 of the
Pennsylvania Code.
82
In Kripp, the wife could likely have been involved in a same-sex
partnership with all of the characteristics that the court associated with
marriage, including "financial, social and sexual interdependence, and a
opposite sex who is not a member of the family of the petitioner [alimony
recipient] within the degrees of consanguinity."'
Id. (quoting Lobaugh v. Lobaugh, 753 A.2d 834, 836 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000); 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 3706 (1999)).
75. Id. at 164.
76. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3706 (emphasis added).
77. Id.
78. See Kripp, 784 A.2d at 165.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 163 (quoting Miller v. Miller, 508 A.2d 550, 554 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)).
81. Id. at 163 (quoting Miller, 508 A.2d at 554).
82. See PA. CONS. STAT. § 3706 (1999).
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sharing of the same residence." 83  The superior court reached an
inequitable result in refusing to terminate the ex-husband's alimony
payments while his ex-wife was sharing all of her personal expenses and
financial obligations with a romantic partner. Regardless of the
persuasive factual circumstances, the court refused to apply the definition
of cohabitation to a same-sex couple.84 The husband was prevented from
attempting to persuade the court that his wife was "cohabiting" under the
applicable statute because she was living with a same-sex partner.
85
Despite the mandate that cohabitation only includes members of the
opposite sex, it is entirely possible that all of the requirements for and
characteristics of cohabitation, excluding heterosexuality, may be
fulfilled by a same-sex couple. Same-sex couples may be romantically
involved while sharing household, personal, and financial
responsibilities. This describes a relationship akin to marriage, which
may consist of any two consenting individuals, regardless of their sex
and sexual orientation.
Pennsylvania's Kripp decision represents an inequitable judicial
result attributable to an unworkable statute in light of the modem status
of homosexual couples. The two most important objectives of alimony
are "support and fairness," both of which the Kripp decision violates.
86
Because the recipient spouse was likely sharing household and living
expenses in a relationship akin to marriage, she needed less support from
her ex-husband to live comfortably.87 It is unfair to require the payor
spouse to continue to make alimony payments when the recipient is
significantly less in need than at the time of the initial award.
The statute requiring a cohabitating couple to be of the opposite sex
was a drawback in this situation. The court was fearful of taking an
active role in expanding the definition of cohabitation. 88  The court
83. See Kripp, 784 A.2d at 163.
84. See id.
85. It is important to note that the Kripp decision has been granted appeal and will
soon be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Id. at 830. The Petition for
Allowance of Appeal has been granted limited to "whether parol evidence should have
been admitted to ascertain the parties' intended definition of the term 'cohabitation' in a
property settlement agreement." Id. If, on appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court finds
that parol evidence was erroneously excluded in the lower court, the case will be
remanded and the parties will be allowed to introduce evidence in an effort to prove
whether they intended to include same-sex partners in the meaning of cohabitation as
used in their Property Settlement Agreement. Because the court has accepted appeal
limited to the question of the admissibility of parol evidence, the court lacks the authority
to expand the statutory and common law definitions of cohabitation to include members
of the same sex.
86. 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation, supra note 21, § 750; see also In re
Marriage of LaRocque, 406 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Wis. 1987).
87. See Kripp, 784 A.2d at 163.
88. See id. at 164.
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stressed that lawmaking was the job of the legislature and that it was
improper for the court to broaden the statute.
8 9
B. A Workable Statute and an Equitable Judicial Interpretation:
Utah 's Garcia v. Garcia9"
1. Facts, Holding, and Statutory Authority
In 2002, a Utah state appellate court considered a case factually
analogous to Pennsylvania's Kripp but instead found in favor of the
plaintiff.9' In Garcia, the Utah appellate court held that an ex-wife's
involvement in a same-sex relationship constituted cohabitation for the
purpose of her ex-husband's petition to terminate alimony.92
In Garcia, the Utah court considered the facts surrounding the ex-
wife's living situation to determine that the ex-wife was, in fact,
cohabiting with another woman. 93 Diane Garcia admitted that she had
lived with another woman, Ellis, for over two years and that she and Ellis
had "shared a bedroom, bed, and had sexual contact" while they lived
together. 94 Further, Diane Garcia admitted that she and Ellis had "shared
living expenses" for over two years while they resided together.95 Based
on these facts, Garcia's ex-husband asserted that because Diane Garcia
had "admitted a relationship constituting cohabitation," alimony
payments should be terminated.96
On appeal, the court examined the applicable statute, section 30-3-
5(9) of the Utah Code.97 The relevant provision reads: "[a]ny order of
89. See id. at 163.
90. Garcia v. Garcia, 60 P.3d 1174 (Utah Ct. App. 2002).
91. Id. Contrary to the Pennsylvania trial court's decision in Kripp, the trial court in
Garcia concluded that "the plain meaning of cohabitation requires a sexual relationship
between members of the opposite sex." Id. at 1175. In Garcia, however, the court of
appeals disagreed, reversed, and remanded. Id. at 1174.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1175-76.
94. Id. at 1174. In her Answer to her ex-husband's Petition to Modify the Decree of
Divorce, Diane Garcia failed to respond to her ex-husband's Request for Admissions. Id.
Because Diane Garcia did not affirm or deny her husband's allegations, they were
considered admissions at trial. Id. Pursuant to Rule 36(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure:
Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set forth.
The matter is admitted unless, within thirty days after service of the request, or
within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom
the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written
answer or objection addressed to the matter ....
UTAH R. Civ. P. 36(a)(2).
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the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is
cohabitating with another person." 98  Because cohabitation was not
defined in the relevant statutory provision, the court of appeals relied
upon precedent for the necessary elements that constituted cohabitation.99
The court cited a decision from 1996, in which it discussed the test for
determining cohabitation. The court explained "in Pendleton v.
Pendleton ... we ruled that '[c]ohabitation is comprised of... two
elements: (1) common residency and (2) sexual contact evidencing a
conjugal association.""100 The court of appeals therefore held that Diane
Garcia was in fact cohabiting with a member of the same sex'0 1 and
terminated her ex-husband's alimony obligation.
0 2
The language of the applicable statutory provision that the court
considered in Garcia played a significant role in the outcome of the case.
Importantly, the applicable statutory provision concerning cohabitation
was not specifically written to exclude same-sex couples. The relevant
provision of the Utah Code provides "[a]ny order of the court that a party
pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the
party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another
person."'0 3 The Utah Court of Appeals examined the plain language of
the statute and found that cohabitation was not limited to heterosexual
relationships. 10 4 The court focused on the plain language of the statute,
which "contains no requirement that the other person be a member of the
opposite sex."'10 5 Unlike the statute that the Pennsylvania Superior Court
considered, the Utah statute did not specifically limit cohabitation to
heterosexual couples.
After finding that the Utah legislature's language did not restrict the
definition of cohabitation to two individuals of the opposite sex, the court
determined that Diane Garcia also fulfilled the common law
requirements for cohabitation. Based upon the facts that Diane Garcia
admitted, it was apparent that Garcia and her partner shared a "common
residence" and had "sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association."
' 10 6
The court thus found that Diane Garcia's actions fulfilled both the
98. Id. (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-30-5(9) (1998)).
99. Id. at 1175 (discussing Pendelton v. Pendelton, 918 P.2d 159 (Utah Ct. App.
1996)).
100. Id. (quoting Pendelton, 918 P.2d at 160, n. 1).
101. Id. at 1175-76.
102. Id. at 1176.
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common law elements and the statutory definition of cohabitation.° 7
2. Implications of the Decision
The Garcia decision represents a more equitable judicial result than
Pennsylvania's Kripp decision.'0 8 This is attributable to the drafting of
section 30-30-5(9) of the Utah Code. 109 The relevant provision was
written in a much more inclusive fashion than was the relevant
Pennsylvania provision, permitting inclusion of same-sex couples in
those who may cohabitate." ° It was conceivable for the Utah court to
conclude that the recipient spouse had fulfilled the two common law
elements of cohabitation based upon her admissions at trial."' In
keeping with the objectives of alimony, support and fairness," 2 the
Garcia decision was much more equitable than the Kripp decision."
3
C. An Unworkable Statute and an Inequitable Judicial Decision
Prompting Legislative Action. Georgia's Van Dyck v. Van Dyck'
14
1. Facts, Holding, and Statutory Authority
The Supreme Court of Georgia examined a case analogous to
Pennsylvania's Kripp and Utah's Garcia in 1993.115 In Van Dyck v. Van
Dyck, the court denied the ex-husband's request to terminate his alimony
obligation because the applicable statute did not specifically include
same-sex couples in the definition of cohabitation. 1
6
In Van Dyck, the ex-husband alleged that his former wife was
involved in a "homosexual meretricious relationship" in order to stop
107. Id. at 1176.
108. Compare id. with Kripp v. Kripp, 784 A.2d 158 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
109. § 30-30-5(9).
110. Compare id. with 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3706.
111. See Garcia, 60 P.3d at 1174.
112. 24A AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation, supra note 21, § 750; see also In re
Marriage of LaRocque, 406 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Wis. 1987).
113. Compare Garcia, 60 P.3d 1174, with Kripp, 784 A.2d at 158.
114. Van Dyck v. Van Dyck, 425 S.E.2d 853 (Ga. 1993).
115. Id. Van Dyck was a case of first impression in Georgia. Id.
116. Id. at 854. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
decision. Interestingly, the trial court relied on "legislative goals and intent" to conclude
that the applicable Georgia statute permitted modification of alimony where an alimony
recipient was cohabiting with a member of either sex. Id. The trial court concluded that
"any other construction of the statute would render it unconstitutional as a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution." Id. The court asserted that the trial
court was not authorized to construe the language of the applicable statute beyond the
statute's "clear and unambiguous" language. Id.
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paying her alimony." 17 Despite the trial court's finding that the recipient
spouse was cohabiting with an individual of the same sex, the Supreme
Court of Georgia reversed the decision."18  The court asserted that,
although the recipient spouse was sharing living quarters and expenses
with another person, alimony modification was not justified because a
same-sex couple could not cohabitate under the applicable statute. " 9
As written, the applicable statute did not include members of the
same sex in the definition of cohabitation. 2 0 The Supreme Court of
Georgia asserted that the judiciary lacks the authority to construe statutes
in a way that differs from the statute's plain meaning, which was what
the trial court had done. 12' The supreme court stressed that the language
of the statue was clear and unambiguous. The statute read: "As used in
this subsection, the word 'cohabitation' means dwelling together
continuously and openly in a meretricious relationship with a person of
the opposite sex.'' 22  Because the statute restricted cohabitation to
individuals of opposite sexes, the Georgia Supreme Court refused to
modify the payor's alimony obligation.
123
2. Implications of the Decision: Post- Van Dyck Statutory
Revision
The decision of the Georgia Supreme Court in Van Dyck represents
an inequitable judicial decision similar to that of Pennsylvania's Kripp
ruling. 124 Despite the fact that the recipient spouse in Van Dyck was
sharing living expenses with another person, the court refused to expand
117. Id. Black's Law Dictionary defines "meretricious" as: "1. Involving prostitution;
of an unlawful sexual nature. 2. (Of a romantic relationship) involving either two people
of the same sex or lack of capacity on the part of one party; 3. Superficially attractive but
fake nonetheless; alluring by false show." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 801 (7th ed. 1999).
118. Van Dyck, 425 S.E.2d at 853.
119. Id. at 854.
120. Id.
121. Id. The trial court had taken the liberty to look beyond the plain language of the
statute toward the "legislative goals and intent." Id.
122. See id. (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-19(b) (2003)). The full relevant
provision of the code read:
Subsequent to a final judgment of divorce awarding periodic payment of
alimony for the support of a spouse, the voluntary cohabitation of such former
spouse with a third party in a meretricious relationship shall also be grounds to
modify provisions made for periodic payments of permanent alimony for the
support of the former spouse. As used in this subsection, the word
"cohabitation" means dwelling together continuously and openly in a
meretricious relationship with a person of the opposite sex.
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-19(b).
123. See id.
124. Compare Kripp v. Kripp, 784 A.2d 158 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) with GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-6-19(b) (2003).
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the statute to include members of the same sex in the definition of
cohabitation. 2 5  This result is contrary to the support and fairness
objectives of alimony. Justice Sears-Collins issued a concurrence in Van
Dyck that adequately expresses the inequity in which the decision
resulted.'26 In his concurring opinion, Justice Sears-Collins wrote:
Alimony is based on an ex-spouse's need, and if in reality that need
decreases, alimony probably should be reduced or even terminated.
Logically, it should make no difference whether the ex-spouse has
remarried, is living in a meretricious relationship with a person of the
opposite sex or is living with a gay partner. In a perfect world it
ought to be the financial reality that counts. But this is not yet a
perfect world. 1
27
The remarks of Justice Sears-Collins provide an insightful and accurate
statement of the problems apparent in both the Van Dyck and Kripp
decisions.
Soon after the Georgia Supreme Court's final decision in Van Dyck,
the legislature responded with a statutory revision to prevent future
inequitable decisions. 12  The legislature revised the applicable statutory
definition of cohabitation. The revised provision now reads:
Subsequent to a final judgment of divorce awarding periodic payment
of alimony for the support of a spouse, the voluntary cohabitation of
such former spouse with a third party in a meretricious relationship
shall also be grounds to modify provisions made for periodic
payments of permanent alimony for the support of the former spouse.
As used in this subsection, the word "cohabitation" means dwelling
together continuously and openly in a meretricious relationship with
another person, regardless of the sex of the other person.129
Instead of restricting cohabitation to persons of the opposite sex, the
revised definition of cohabitation now includes same-sex partners. 130
The Georgia legislature responded quickly after issuance of the Van
Dyck decision. 131 Should a case similar to Van Dyck arise in Georgia
today, the result will not be an inequitable one.
125. See Van Dyck, 425 S.E.2d at 854.
126. Id. at 855 (Sears-Collins, J., concurring).
127. Id. (Sears-Collins, J., concurring).
128. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-19(b) (1992) with GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-19(b)
(2003).
129. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-19(b) (2003).
130. See id.
131. See id. The legislature revised the statute in 1993, the same year that Van Dyck
was decided. Id.
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IV. Conclusion: Possible Solutions to Inequitable Continuance of
Alimony Payments
As evident in the discussion of the preceding cases in which an ex-
spouse entered a same-sex relationship, it is apparent that homosexuality
cannot be viewed as separate and isolated from heterosexuality. 32
Sexual orientation may not always remain constant throughout an
individual's lifetime. The Kripp, Garcia, and Van Dyck decisions
provide support for the assertion that sexuality is not static for all
individuals. These decisions are also important because they show the
need for statutory revision in this area of law.
A. Following Georgia's Lead: A Suggestion for Statutory Revision in
Pennsylvania
Statutory revision, as seen in Georgia, presents the most viable
option for preventing inequitable continuance of alimony payments in
states that restrict cohabitation to members of the opposite sex. The
Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Van Dyck was an effective
suggestion to the state legislature. The legislature responded with a
statutory revision, essentially preventing a similar inequitable judicial
result.
Statutory revision is a viable option for Pennsylvania. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court should implore the legislature to modify
the statute to include same-sex couples in the definition of cohabitation
to prevent future inequities. The legislature will likely respond, as did
Georgia's legislature, because the Kripp decision represents an unfair
result. Similarly unfair results may follow should a case factually
analogous to Kripp arise without statutory revision.
B. Another Suggested Remedy
The preceding analysis has proposed that it is fundamentally unfair
for a court to order continuance of alimony payments when an ex-spouse
is essentially "married" to a member of the same sex. Conversely, it is
problematic for a court to terminate alimony payments in such a situation
because the vast majority of states refuse to recognize a relationship
legally akin to marriage between members of the same sex. If same-sex
partners are prohibited from having their committed relationship
recognized by law, it seems hypocritical for a court to terminate an
alimony award based upon an ex-spouse's "married" homosexual status.
132. Garcia v. Garcia, 60 P.3d 1174 (Utah Ct. App. 2002); Kripp v. Kripp, 784 A.2d
158 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001); Van Dyck, 425 S.E.2d 853.
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State-wide legal recognition of same-sex partnerships would
provide ease and certainty with regard to maintenance obligations.
While this may seem to be a drastic proposal, uniform state-wide legal
recognition of same-sex relationships would provide the legal
community with a more easily ascertainable standard for examining
maintenance obligations. If same-sex relationships were legally
recognized, there would be no question as to whether a state's definition
of "cohabitation" included same-sex couples.
